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Introduction 
 I wish to thank Jan Deckers for his careful critique of my article.1 As it happens, I 
largely agree with Deckers’s overall assessment of my previous argument. Further 
research since the publication of that article has led me to conclude that the account I 
previously defended is not sufficiently compelling to negate the conclusion that, from a 
Thomistic metaphysical perspective, a human embryo is rationally ensouled at 
conception. I have developed my current view in two publications to which I refer the 
reader.2 In this response, I will indicate the points on which Deckers and I agree or 
disagree, and conclude by discussing a particular theological issue Deckers raises. 
Why Deckers Is Right 
 Deckers asserts that “the fact that early embryos depend on the right environment 
for their survival cannot be used to support the claim that they are not ensouled.”3 This 
assertion, I now contend, is correct. An embryo’s requirement of a supportive, nutritive 
uterine environment does not preclude its possessing an active potentiality to develop 
itself into an actually thinking rational being. A uterus provides a supportive environment 
for an embryo to exercise its own developmental capacity. Uterine implantation does not 
                                                
1 See J. Deckers. Why Eberl Is Wrong: Reflections on the Beginning of Personhood. Bioethics 2007; 21: 
[#]; J.T. Eberl. The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis. Bioethics 2000; 14: 134-
57. 
2 J.T. Eberl. Aquinas’s Account of Human Embryogenesis and Recent Interpretations. Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 2005; 30: 379-94; J.T. Eberl. 2006. Thomistic Principles and Bioethics. New York. 
Routledge: ch. 2.  
3 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
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alter an embryo’s intrinsic nature or bestow upon it more inherent potentialities than it 
already possesses. 
 The form of external assistance a uterus provides is akin to an astronaut’s 
spacesuit or an underwater explorer’s submarine. Each provides what the person needs to 
exercise her vital metabolic capacities; but the lack of such support does not entail that 
she lacks those capacities. If an astronaut’s spacesuit malfunctions and stops supplying 
oxygen, her vital metabolic functions will cease shortly thereafter. If, however, a fellow 
astronaut fixes her suit in a timely fashion and restores the flow of oxygen, her vital 
metabolic functions will resume. This indicates that the astronaut’s intrinsic capacity for 
such functions remained despite the loss of the requisite supportive environment.4 
Another relevant example is the incubator most prematurely born infants require to 
continue their post-natal development. Although such infants cannot survive without the 
incubator’s assistance, their dependence on it does not entail that their potentiality for full 
development is merely passive and not self-directed.5 
 Deckers also correctly notes that there is evidence of an inchoate organization and 
intercommunication among the cells that constitute an early embryo.6 Such organization 
and intercommunication may also indicate functional interdependence among the cells. 
Evidence of an inchoate organization among an early embryo’s cells is their coming 
together at implantation to form the primitive streak, as well as other embryonic and 
extra-embryonic tissues shortly thereafter. Germain Grisez thus charges that “[Norman] 
                                                
4 Does the astronaut’s dependence on her fellow astronaut’s assistance in restoring her supportive 
environment imply that her potentiality for being alive is merely passive? No, because the assistance 
provided does nothing to alter or replace the astronaut’s organic structure by which she is able to breathe in 
and circulate oxygen once it is made available to her again. 
5 These examples are taken from Eberl, op. cit. note 2 (2006), p. 85. 
6 See Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. This paragraph and the following are taken from Eberl, op.cit. note 2 
(2006), pp. 35-6.  
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Ford7 has trouble explaining why a few thousand distinct individuals work together in 
embryogenesis to make themselves into one individual.”8 Other critics of Ford’s account 
have noted that an embryo has an “identifiable body plan” before implantation and 
formation of the primitive streak.9 
 Furthermore, as Deckers notes, Ford acknowledges that there is some sort of 
“clock” mechanism programmed in a zygote’s DNA that guides organic development and 
“continues through childhood for the growth of teeth, biological changes at puberty, 
adulthood etc. right through to old age.”10 This clock “seems to be set from the time of 
fertilization, with each cell’s ‘clock’ running in dependence on, and in co-ordination 
with, what is happening in its surrounding cells.”11 Ford interprets this phenomenon as 
supporting his view that each cell constituting an early embryo is a distinct individual 
organism that has its own internal clock, which is synchronized with the clocks of the 
other cells. Grisez counters that such harmonious synchronization to be what one would 
expect if such cells “are, not a mass of distinct individuals, but integral parts of one 
developing individual.”12 
                                                
7 See N. Ford. 1988. When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and 
Science. New York. Cambridge University Press. My previous argument is largely indebted to Ford’s 
account in this work. 
8 G. Grisez. When Do People Begin? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 
1989; 63: 27-47. Cf. P. Lee. 1996. Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, D.C. Catholic 
University of America Press, 102; C. Tollefsen. Embryos, Individuals, and Persons: An Argument Against 
Embryo Creation and Research. Journal of Applied Philosophy 2001; 18: 72; R. George. Human Cloning 
and Embryo Research. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 2004; 25: 14-15. 
9 See J. Vial Correa and M. Dabike. 1998. The Embryo as an Organism. In Identity and Statute of Human 
Embryo. J. Vial Correa and E. Sgreccia, eds. Vatican City. Libreria Editrice Vaticana: 317-28; A. Serra and 
R. Colombo. 1998. Identity and Status of the Human Embryo: The Contribution of Biology. In Vial Correa 
and Sgreccia, op. cit. note 9; A. Fisher. When Did I Begin? Revisited. Linacre Quarterly 1991; 58: 66; P. 
Flaman. When Did I Begin? Another Critical Response to Norman Ford. Linacre Quarterly 1991; 58: 46. 
10 Ford, op. cit. note 7, p. 155, n. 37. 
11 Ford, op. cit. note 7, p. 155. 
12 Grisez, op. cit. note 8, p. 38. Cf. Tollefsen, op. cit. note 8, p. 72. 
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 Finally, Deckers rightly argues that the apparently random nature of cellular 
differentiation – which parts of the body or extra-embryonic organs each cell will 
ultimately form – also does not preclude an early embryo’s internal organization: “the 
fact that these cells differentiate at all, and in particular ways, suggests the existence of a 
determining factor or organising principle that is internal to the embryo.”13 Benedict 
Ashley goes further to describe the differentiation that occurs as early as the zygote’s first 
cleavage: 
From the moment of fertilization there already exists in the zygote (and 
this was probably already pre-determined in the ovum) a metabolic 
polarity, with the nucleus determining the upper pole of the metabolic 
gradient, and a bilaterality which will eventually be fundamental to the 
plan of the adult body. Consequently, as the first cell-divisions take place, 
there is already some differentiation in the cytoplasm of the daughter cells. 
They may be totipotential when separated, but as existing in the morula, 
they already constitute heterogeneous parts.14 
 
Various studies on the development of mouse embryos support Ashley’s description of an 
inherent organizational structure in a zygote and its daughter cells that determines an 
early embryo’s future biological development.15 
 
 
                                                
13 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
14 B. Ashley. 1976. A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization. In An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal 
Experimentation: An Interdisciplinary Study. D. McCarthy and A. Moraczewski, eds. St. Louis. Pope John 
XXIII Center, 123. Cf. B. Ashley and A. Moraczewski. Cloning, Aquinas, and the Embryonic Person. The 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2001; 1: 197; George, op. cit. note 8, p. 14. 
15 See R.L. Gardner. The Early Blastocyst is Bilaterally Symmetrical and Its Axis of Symmetry is Aligned 
with the Animal-Vegetal Axis of the Zygote in the Mouse. Development 1997; 124: 289-301; R.L. Gardner. 
Specification of Embryonic Axes Begins Before Cleavage in Normal Mouse Development. Development 
2001; 128: 839-47; R.L. Gardner. Thoughts and Observations on Patterning in Early Mammalian 
Development. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 2002; 4: 46-51; K. Piotrowska and M. Zernicka-Goetz. 
Role for Sperm in Spatial Patterning of the Early Mouse Embryo. Nature 2001; 409: 517-21; K. 
Piotrowska, F. Wianny, R.A. Pedersen, and M. Zernicka-Goetz. Blastomeres Arising from the First 
Cleavage Division have Distinguishable Fates in Normal Mouse Development. Development 2001; 128: 
3739-48; R. Beddington and E. Robertson. Axis Development and Early Asymmetry in Mammals. Cell 
1999; 96: 195-209. 
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The Nature of the Soul and the Metaphysics of Twinning 
 Despite my overall agreement with Deckers’s criticisms of my previous 
argument, he makes two erroneous contentions. First, he refers to Christian Munthe’s 
claim that the thesis that a substance’s divisibility precludes its being ensouled is based 
on “the Platonic-Cartesian idea of the soul as an indivisible substance or ‘ego.’”16 It is not 
accurate, however, to characterize my previous argument as implying such a description 
of the rational soul that informs a person’s body. According to the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
concept, a rational soul is indivisible insofar as it is essentially the substantial form of a 
particular body: “Therefore, just as it is of the soul’s nature that it is the form of a body, 
so it is of this soul’s nature, insofar as it is this soul, that it has an inclination toward this 
body.”17 A rational soul can thus be described as the “blueprint” for the particular body of 
which it is the substantial form.18 This understanding of the relationship between a 
rational soul and its body stands opposed to the Platonic-Cartesian view in which it does 
not necessarily matter to which body a particular soul is conjoined. While both views 
imply the soul’s indivisibility, they do so for different reasons. 
 The second, more significant, point of disagreement stems from Deckers’s 
reference to the example, raised by John Haldane and Patrick Lee,19 of a flatworm’s 
divisibility which does not preclude its being ensouled – in this case, by a sensitive 
                                                
16 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. See C. Munthe. Divisibility and the Moral Status of Embryos. Bioethics 
2001; 15: 395. 
17 Aquinas. Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis [QDSC]: IX ad 4. R. Spiazzi, ed. 1949. 
Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2. Turin. Marietti. Cf. QDSC: IX ad 15; Aquinas. Quaestio disputata de 
anima [QDA]: I ad 10. All translations are my own and are taken, unless otherwise noted, from the Leonine 
edition of Aquinas’s works: Aquinas. 1882- . S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Opera Omnia. Rome. 
Commissio Leonina. 
18 See J.T. Eberl. The Metaphysics of Resurrection: Issues of Identity in Thomas Aquinas. Proceedings of 
the American Catholic Philosophical Association 2000; 74: 221. For a fuller treatment of a rational soul’s 
relationship to the body it informs, see J.T. Eberl. Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings. Review of 
Metaphysics 2004; 58: 333-65. 
19 See J. Haldane and P. Lee. Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion, and the Value of Life. Philosophy 
2003; 78: 274. 
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soul.20 This example is intriguing, because Aquinas also discusses the phenomenon of 
flatworm division and compares a flatworm’s soul with a human person’s: 
It must be said that in those animals which live when divided there is one 
soul in act and many in potency. Now through division they are brought 
forth into an actual multitude, as happens in all forms which have 
extension in matter.21 
 
Aquinas describes a flatworm as having one soul before it is divided. Its soul, however, is 
“potentially many” since, if the flatworm is properly divided, its soul will become 
“actually many.” It thus seems that a flatworm’s soul can be “divided” through division 
of its matter. Because of its potentiality for such division, a flatworm may exist as a 
unified substance and then cease to exist by being divided. The original flatworm’s soul 
ceases to be one as its potential to be many is actualized.  
 Aquinas’s construal of a flatworm’s division does not preclude its existence as an 
individual substance before its division.22 Nevertheless, a flatworm does not survive the 
division. Neither of the two resulting flatworms is identical to the original; neither 
flatworm has the same soul as the original, for the original’s soul ceased to exist when it 
was divided into many.23 Hence, Aquinas’s metaphysical construal of a flatworm’s 
division does not cohere with embryonic twinning unless it is the case that a rationally 
ensouled embryo dies when it divides into twins who are each a newly created person. 
Aquinas thus distinguishes the possible division of a flatworm’s soul from the impossible 
division of a rational soul: 
                                                
20 A “sensitive” soul has the relevant capacities for life and sensation, but not rationality, and is the type of 
soul proper to all non-human species of the animal genus. See Aristotle. De anima: II.2-3.   
21 QDSC: IV ad 19. Cf. Aquinas. Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei [QDP]: III.12 ad 5; Aquinas. 
Sententia super Metaphysicam [In M]: VII.16.1635; Aquinas. Sententia libri De anima [In DA]: II.4. 
22 See Aquinas. Scriptum super sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi [In Sent]: I.8.v.3 ad 2. 
23 See E. Stump. 2003. Aquinas. New York. Routledge, 41. 
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Soul united to a body [i.e., a rational soul] is not multiplied in the way of 
material forms which are divisible by the division of their subject, but 
remains in itself simple and one.24 
    
While Aquinas would not endorse the comparison of a flatworm’s division to 
embryonic twinning, this comparison does not purport twinning to involve the same 
metaphysical implications as a flatworm’s division. The main point is that the potentiality 
to divide into two or more organisms does not preclude an organism’s previous 
substantial unity; this is the same for both flatworms and embryos. Nevertheless, whereas 
a flatworm’s division involves the division of its soul, and thereby the original flatworm’s 
destruction, an embryo’s soul cannot be so divided.   
This results in a sharp distinction between Deckers’s conclusion regarding 
embryonic twinning, given rational ensoulment at conception, and my current view. I 
propose that, when an embryo twins, it is not the case that it is “dividing,” but that it loses 
some of its matter – a cluster of cells. Since the separated cell cluster is totipotent, i.e., it 
has an active potentiality to develop into an actually thinking rational being, it is 
informed – once divided – by a newly created rational soul.25 It is not necessary to accept 
Ford’s conclusion that an embryo’s potentiality to divide is a threat to its previous 
substantial unity. Furthermore, the understanding of twinning as an event in which an 
embryo loses some of its matter, rather than dividing like a flatworm, allows for an 
embryo to maintain its substantial unity through the twinning process and result in one of 
the twins being identical to the original embryo.26 
                                                
24 QDP: V.10 ad 6. R. Spiazzi, ed. 1949. Quaestiones disputatae, vol. 2. Turin. Marietti. Cf. Aquinas. 
Summa contra gentiles [SCG]: II.86; QDSC: IV ad 9; QDA: X ad 15. 
25 Aquinas holds that each rational soul is created within the body it informs directly by God. This claim 
will be discussed at length in the final section. 
26 This conclusion is originally stated in Eberl, op. cit. note 2 (2006), p. 39. Of course, it would be most 
difficult to establish any epistemic criteria for determining which of the twins is the same as the original. 
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 This view is contrary to Deckers’s assertion that, in cases of embryonic twinning, 
“Both twins were one embryo during their earliest developmental stages, and at some 
point started developing in separation from each other. Their ‘ongoing ontological 
identity’ is not threatened by the fact that they once were only one individual.”27 This 
claim implies Rose Koch-Hershenov’s contention that there are two “co-located” souls in 
embryos that are destined to twin.28 
Koch-Hershenov’s contention is problematic for several reasons. First, it goes 
against Aquinas’s argument that only one rational soul informs the matter of each 
individual human organism.29 Second, Koch-Hershenov and David Hershenov argue that 
the metaphysical possibility of spatially coincident objects, such as a statue and the lump 
of clay that constitutes it, supports the possibility that a single embryo may constitute two 
human organisms – and thus two persons.30 This argument requires that there may be 
spatially coincident objects of the same kind. Hershenov defends this thesis by using the 
example of two roads that converge at a certain point: the same bricks and gravel 
constitute two different roads, one from Santa Barbara to Las Vegas and the other from 
Los Angeles to Las Vegas.31 Even if Hershenov’s thesis were accepted, however, it does 
not follow that two organisms – or two persons – may be spatially coincident. 
                                                                                                                                            
Such epistemic uncertainty, however, does not preclude the ontological claim that one of the twins is 
identical with the original while the other is not. 
27 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
28 See R. Koch-Hershenov. Totipotency, Twinning, and Ensoulment at Fertilization. Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 2006; 31: 158-60. 
29 See In DA: II.5; Aquinas. Summa theologiae [ST]: Ia.76.3-4; Aquinas. De unitate intellectus contra 
Averroistas: I. 
30 See J. Eberl, R. Koch-Hershenov, and D. Hershenov. The Metaphysical Nuances of Hylomorphism. The 
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 2006; 6: 11. 
31 See D. Hershenov. Can There Be Spatially Coincident Objects of the Same Kind? Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 2003; 31: 1-22. 
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Furthermore, it is at odds with Aquinas’s argument that two physical bodies – e.g., the 
bodies of two human organisms – cannot be spatially coincident: 
If two bodies are in the same place, it follows that the dimensions of both 
bodies are the same as the dimensions of the place. It thus follows that 
they are the same as each other, which is impossible. 
 
Consequently, since matter is subject to dimensions as found in all bodies, 
it must be that any two bodies are prohibited, by the very nature of 
corporeity, from being in the same place.32 
 
 Finally, it is not in line with Aquinas’s logic to hold that something’s being 
divisible entails that it is already metaphysically divided, even if spatially coincident, into 
two distinct substances: “For, because a thing is divisible, it is not thereby many except 
potentially”;33 “Yet it is not the case that in such animals [e.g., divisible flatworms] any 
part is called an animal before division, except potentially.”34 So, if I am physically 
divisible, it does not entail that I am actually many distinct substances. I am potentially 
many, in that part of my matter may cease to compose me and come to compose another 
substance.35 This type of potentiality, however, is passive in that an external agent must 
act upon me to make the division actual; I cannot naturally divide myself. In the same 
way, an embryo that may divide into identical twins has only a passive potentiality for 
such division,36 which does not preclude its actual existence – prior to the division – as 
one substance: a rationally ensouled human person. 
                                                
32 Aquinas. Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate: IV.3. 
33 In M: V.8.884. R. Cathala and R. Spiazzi, eds. 1950. Turin: Marietti. 
34 In Sent: I.8.v.3 ad 2. P. Mandonnet and M. Moos, eds. 1929-47. 4 volumes. Paris: Lethielleux.  
35 An example of such division would be if one of my somatic cells were separated from me and used to 
create a clone. 
36 While the biological process of twinning is not fully understood, it appears to be a random event, with no 
apparent internal genetic factor or any clear environmental factor that causes an embryo to twin. See A. 
Piontelli. 2002. Twins: From Fetus to Child. New York. Routledge, 19. To the best scientific 
understanding, it is as likely that twinning is caused by factors respective of the uterine environment acting 
upon weak intercellular bonds to cause the embryo to lose some of its cells as it is that an embryo is 
genetically “programmed” to divide. If there were a genetic determiner for twinning intrinsic to an embryo, 
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Divine Creation of Rational Souls 
 I now turn to a theological issue Deckers raises concerning whether God directly 
creates each rational soul. Aquinas argues that a rational soul cannot result, as in the case 
of other forms of material substances, simply from matter being actualized in the 
appropriate way: 
The intellective soul37 cannot be educed from the potentiality of matter; 
for it was already shown above38 that the intellective soul itself entirely 
exceeds the power of matter, because it has an operation without matter … 
Therefore, the intellective soul is not educed into being through the 
transmutation of matter, nor through the action of a power in semen.39 
 
A rational soul’s intellective capacities are not dependent upon any material body 
for their functioning insofar as such capacities surpass the limits of matter in their ability 
to understand the universal forms of things; such universal forms are the natures of things 
understood as abstracted from any particular material conditions. Since intellective 
capacities surpass the limits of matter, no purely material process can be responsible for 
the generation of substantial forms with such capacities. All other substantial forms of 
material substances can be generated through purely material processes. Aquinas thus 
argues that a rational soul must receive its existence directly from God: 
It must be said that it is from the first cause [God] that such a soul has its 
existence, also that it is intellectual and is a soul and consequently that it is 
impressed in a body.40 
 
                                                                                                                                            
then one could argue that this factor precludes an embryo that has it from being an individual substance 
prior to its division. There is, though, no conclusive evidence of an intrinsic genetic determiner for 
twinning. See Ford, op. cit. note 7, p. 119. 
37 The term “intellective soul” is synonymous with “rational soul.” 
38 See SCG: II.68, 78; ST: Ia.75.2; In Sent: I.8.v.2 ad 1. 
39 SCG: II.86. 
40 Aquinas. In librum de causis expositio: V. C. Pera, ed. 1955. Turin. Marietti. Cf. ST: Ia.90.2, 118.2; 
SCG: II.87-8. See N. Kretzmann. 1999. The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in 
Summa contra gentiles II. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 384-6. 
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The process of human generation, therefore, is twofold insofar as natural procreative 
activity yields a body that is suited to being informed by a rational soul, but the soul must 
be directly created in the body by God.41 
 Deckers argues that God should not be understood as the cause of a rational soul 
informing a newly formed human embryo. First, he asserts that Aquinas’s account raises 
the problem of “how the soul might be able to function without a body.”42 Second, in 
response to the general account that God causes some things – e.g., a rational soul’s 
existence – and not others – e.g., a flatworm’s sensitive soul or the form of a statue 
constructed through human artifice – raises the problem that “divine causation can be 
postulated to explain anything.”43 Third is the problem of why God does not abstain from 
creating rational souls in embryos formed through illicit sexual activities, such as 
adultery or rape. Deckers concludes with a “view that God does not cause anything” and 
that “no divine intervention is required” for a human person to exist once sperm and 
ovum unite in fertilization.44 
 It is not evident how Aquinas’s account yields Deckers’s first problem, since it is 
a rational soul’s capacity to function intellectively without its body that is the basis for 
his argument that it must be created directly by God. Deckers correctly cites, however, an 
apparent inconsistency in my previous view as I carelessly state, “All types of form are 
essentially integrated with the matter they inform. They cannot exist separate from 
matter.”45 While this is true for all other forms of material substances – including a 
                                                
41 See SCG: II.89; QDP: III.9 ad 5; L. Farmer. Human is Generated by Human and Created by God. 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 1996; 70: 413-27. 
42 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
43 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
44 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
45 Eberl, op. cit. note 1, p. 138. 
 12 
flatworm’s soul or the form of a statue – and such forms are thereby corrupted when their 
bodies die or are destroyed, a rational soul is only naturally integrated with its body. A 
rational soul is essentially incorruptible and can function intellectively without its body; 
yet, even when it is separated at death, a rational soul maintains its essential nature as the 
“blueprint” for its particular body and will re-inform the body at the Resurrection.46 
 It is also not evident how Deckers’s second problem is implied by Aquinas’s 
account. If divine causation47 is allowed in the case of a rational soul, it does not follow 
that anything can be reasonably postulated to be caused by God. Whenever an event 
occurs or something comes to exist for which a purely naturalistic explanation suffices, 
then it is proper, per Ockham’s Razor, not to postulate a divine cause. Aquinas argues, 
however, that a rational soul’s existence cannot be sufficiently explained in purely 
naturalistic terms. Deckers does not critique Aquinas’s argument on its own terms and 
merely asserts that the natural process of procreation is sufficient to account for a rational 
soul’s existence. Deckers needs to offer a metaphysical explanation for how a purely 
material process can produce a form which is essentially immaterial.48 
 Deckers’s third problem raises the classical “problem of evil.” He begins by 
assuming that it is “inappropriate” for God to create a rational soul in cases of adultery or 
rape. He notes Aquinas’s response that God cooperates, not with the sinful desires of 
those engaged in illicit intercourse, but with the good procreative event that results.49 
Deckers then neglects, however, the inherent good of a new human life being created and 
                                                
46 See Eberl, op. cit. note 18 (2000); J.T. Eberl. Pomponazzi and Aquinas on the Intellective Soul. The 
Modern Schoolman 2005; 83: 65-77. 
47 Of the various types of causes defined by Aristotle and adopted by Aquinas, only God’s role as a 
proximate efficient cause is at issue here. God’s being the existential foundation or the ultimate final cause 
of everything that exists is not the focus of Deckers’s critique. 
48 This is analogous to the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind in which it is argued that the 
immaterial properties of consciousness cannot be wholly explained by the physical properties of the brain. 
49 See ST: Ia.118.2 ad 5. 
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implicitly presumes that there is nothing good about a life created through adultery or 
rape. On the contrary, Aquinas holds that a person’s existence is intrinsically good, no 
matter what other negative consequences may be attendant upon her existence.50 
 Deckers notes Aquinas’s contention that fornication is sinful “because intercourse 
between people who are not committed to one another could damage the new life that 
may thus be generated.”51 The emphasis is on “could.” Aquinas states, “Now simple 
fornication brings about an inordinateness which tends toward [vergit] the injury of the 
life of the offspring who is born from such sexual intercourse.”52 Aquinas’s point is that a 
father who is not committed to the mother may not be available to raise his child 
properly. This unhappy consequence, though, is not a direct result of the procreative 
activity in which God participates, but of a further decision on the father’s part not to be 
involved with his child. Nothing prevents a child created through fornication or adultery 
from being properly raised by both of her biological parents – or by adequate substitutes 
– and it is for this purpose that God participates in such illicit sexual activity by creating a 
rational soul if an appropriate body is naturally produced.53 
 Deckers’s approach to this problem is more akin to the Platonic-Cartesian 
understanding of the soul, in which it is completely up to God to decide when and where, 
and under what circumstances, a rational soul comes to exist in a particular human body. 
On the contrary, it is more in line with the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of the 
                                                
50 See Eberl, op. cit. note 2 (2006), p. 71. 
51 Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
52 ST: IIa-IIae.154.2, emphasis mine. For an application of this claim to the issue of reproductive cloning, 
see Eberl, op. cit. note 2 (2006), pp. 90-2. 
53 Admittedly, the case of rape is more difficult to contend with. It must be kept in mind, however, that no 
amount of “damage” which results for the life of a child conceived through such an act would be sufficient 
to negate the intrinsic goodness of the child’s very existence, according to Aquinas. 
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soul to adopt the notion, as one reviewer suggested to Deckers,54 that God had ordained it 
as a “rule” that every appropriately formed human body would be informed by a rational 
soul created in it. Since Aquinas argues that a rational soul is properly united to a human 
body,55 and that God does not create souls without appropriate bodies to inform,56 it is 
most appropriate for God to cooperate with the natural order rationally ordained by God’s 
eternal law57 and not violate this order routinely in cases of sinful procreative activity. 
 In conclusion, it is worth noting that this problem does not relate only to 
Aquinas’s claim that God directly creates each rational soul. Assuming Deckers’s own 
conclusion that a rational soul is generated through the natural procreative process 
without divine intervention, one can ask why, in cases of adultery or rape, God does not 
stop this natural process or annihilate the rational soul before the person can fully 
develop. In broader terms, just as Deckers may question why God created a rational soul 
for Adolf Hitler or Osama bin Laden knowing the negative impact each would have on 
the world, one may question why God did not intervene to stop the natural process by 
which Hitler or bin Laden were created according to Deckers. Of course, this invokes the 
general problem of evil which is beyond the scope of this response, but is a problem with 
which both Aquinas’s and Deckers’s views must contend. 
                                                
54 See Deckers, op. cit. note 1, p. [#]. 
55 See ST: Ia.76.5; SCG: II.90. 
56 See ST: Ia.118.3; SCG: II.83. 
57 See ST Ia-IIae.94.1, 93. God’s eternal law includes not only the natural moral law, but also the physical 
laws of nature. 
